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Abstract
We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers
who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. A friction parameter
is  , the length of the time period until the next meeting. We provide a necessary and
sucient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition
at the linear rate in  , which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargain-
ing mechanisms. The condition requires that buyers and sellers always retain some
bargaining power. The bargaining mechanisms that satisfy this condition are called
nonvanishing bargaining power (NBP) mechanisms. Simple random proposer take-it-
or-leave-it protocols are NBP, while k-double auctions (k-DA) are not. We nd that
k-DAs have equilibria that converge to perfect competition at a linear rate, converge
at a slower rate or even do not converge at all.
Keywords: Matching and Bargaining, Search, Double Auctions, Foundations for
Perfect Competition, Rate of Convergence
JEL Classication Numbers: C73, C78, D83.
1 Introduction
A number of papers on dynamic matching and bargaining have shown that, as frictions
vanish, equilibria converge to perfect competition.1 But it is also important to know how
We thank Mike Peters, Mark Satterthwaite, and seminar participants at Northwestern, SFU and UWO
for helpful comments. We thank SSHRC for nancial support made available through grants 12R27261
and 12R27788. A previous version of the paper was completed when the rst author was visiting the
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science at Kellogg School of Management,
Northwestern University. Its warm hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. Finally, we thank the Editor and
two anonymous referees for their comments.
1Papers that address convergence include Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Gale (1986), Gale (1987),
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990), Mortensen and Wright (2002), and, with private information, Butters
(1979), Wolinsky (1988), De Fraja and Sakovics (2001), Serrano (2002), Moreno and Wooders (2002),
Lauermann (2009), Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007), Atakan (2009).
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rapidly the equilibria converge. To our knowledge, this question has not been addressed in
the literature.
In contrast, the rate of convergence to eciency has been the focus of the literature
on static double auctions. It is important to know how large n needs to be so that we
can call a double auction with n buyers and sellers approximately competitive. Rustichini,
Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994) show robust convergence of double-auction equilibria
in the symmetric class at the fast rate O (1=n) for the bid/oer strategies and the super-
fast rate O
 
1=n2

for the ex ante traders' welfare, where n is the number of traders in
the market.2 Moreover, the double auction converges at the rate that is fastest among
all incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanisms (Satterthwaite and Williams
(2002); Tatur (2005)). Cripps and Swinkels (2005) substantially enrich the model by allow-
ing correlation among bidders' valuations, and show convergence at the rate O
 
1=n2 "

,
where " > 0 is arbitrarily small.3
For a dynamic matching and bargaining market, the question of how small frictions need
to be for equilibria to be approximately competitive is equally important. In this paper,
we ll this gap by proving a rate of convergence result for a decentralized model of trade.
We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are
randomly matched pairwise and bargain without knowing each other's reservation value.
The model is in discrete time and shares several features with the model in Satterthwaite
and Shneyerov (2007). Exactly as in that paper, a friction parameter is  , the length of
the time period until the next meeting. There are per-period participation costs, B for
buyers and S for sellers. There is also time discounting at the instantaneous rate r.
4
Our model is dierent from Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) in that we consider
pairwise matching and general trading mechanisms. (Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007)
restrict attention to auctions.) Atakan (2009) provides an important extension of the
results of Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) to multiple units and allows each trader
to be a proposer with certain probability. Atakan (2009) allows the proposers to oer
direct bargaining mechanisms (DMBs, as dened in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)),
and shows that in equilibrium they can do no better than simply make price oers.5 With
this justication, he connes the analysis to take it or leave it price oer games.6
We consider a class of DBMs, nonvanishing bargaining power (NBP) mechanisms, that
generalize certain properties of the random-proposer take it or leave it games described
above. As the name suggests, the NBP conditions require that each trader has at least
some bargaining power even when  ! 0. When a buyer with valuation v meets a seller
with cost c, there is an expected bargaining surplus U (v; c) available to them, over and
2See also Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989), Satterthwaite and Williams (1989), Satterthwaite (1989),
Williams (1991).
3Reny and Perry (2006) allow interdependent values and show that it is almost ecient and almost fully
aggregates information as n!1, but do not address the rate of convergence issue.
4Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) also discuss the rate of convergence to perfect competition, and the
relevance of making  small. However, there is no general rate of convergence result, but only within a class
of full trade equilibria. They also discuss an interpretation of the inverse of  as a measure of local market
size. We do not repeat these discussions here.
5This parallels the no haggling result in Riley and Zeckhauser (1983).
6Shneyerov and Wong (forthcoming) derive necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of non-
trivial market equilibria for this protocol.
2
above their market values of search. For each active buyer of type v, we require that his
interim utility UB (v) are always at least some (independent of ) fraction B > 0 of the
minimal bargaining surplus minc U (v; c) in his meetings in the market. The condition
for the sellers is parallel. Together with incentive compatibility and ex post individual
rationality of the outcomes, these conditions dene NBP mechanisms.
Our paper's convergence results can be summarized as follows. We show in Theorem
1 (and Corollary 1) that the NBP conditions are necessary and sucient for an incentive
compatible and ex post individually rational DBM to have nontrivial market equilibria
convergent to the Walrasian limit at a linear rate as  ! 0.7 In addition, we also derive an
explicit bound on the ineciency of any nontrivial market equilibrium. We argue that the
bound can be tight when frictions are small.
Using a notion of asymptotic optimality inspired by Satterthwaite and Williams (2002),
we show that the NBP mechanisms are asymptotically optimal: in terms of the welfare, the
rate of convergence cannot be faster for any individually rational DBM (Theorem 2). Our
notion of asymptotic optimality diers from that in Satterthwaite and Williams (2002).
There it means that the rate of convergence is the fastest possible for some distributions
of traders' types (worst-case asymptotic optimal). Our notion means that the rate of
convergence is the fastest possible for any distributions of traders' types.8
The equilibria of several interesting protocols lead to NBP mechanisms and therefore
converge at the fastest possible rate. We show that this is the case for the random-proposer
take it or leave it protocol described above. We also show that this is the case for several
other protocols where each trader can guarantee that he or she can make a take it or leave
it oer with a positive probability.
One popular protocol that has equilibrium outcomes that are not NBP is the k-double
auction (k-DA). We nd that k-DA equilibria can be either convergent at a linear rate,
convergent at a slower rate or even divergent. Our double auction result can be compared
to the ndings in Serrano (2002). In a dynamic setting, Serrano (2002) studies a mechanism
that in some respects resembles a double auction (the set of bids is restricted to be a
nite grid) and nds that \as discounting is removed, equilibria with Walrasian and non-
Walrasian features persist".9 Serrano points out, however, that \after removing the nite
sets of traders' types and of allowed prices, the present model conrms Gale's one-price
result and has a strong Walrasian avor". We, on the other hand, nd that in our model,
non-convergent equilibria exist even if the bargaining protocol is the \unrestricted" double
auction.
Lauermann (2009) also adopts a general mechanism approach in a setting with exoge-
nous exit of traders and no search cost as in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008), and
proposes a set of necessary and sucient conditions on limit market outcomes that guar-
antee convergence to perfect competition. Lauermann (2009) does not address the issue
of the rate of convergence. Our k-DA examples show that the rate of convergence can be
arbitrarily slow. At the same time, we completely characterize the sequences of mechanisms
7A trivial, uninteresting equilibrium in which none of the traders enter always exists.
8In our model, each trader's type is distributed on [0; 1] interval and has a nonvanishing density there.
9This simplied bargaining mechanism was introduced in Wolinsky (1990) and also used in Blouin and
Serrano (2001).
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that converge at the fastest possible rate, which is shown to be linear in  .10
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
derives basic properties of equilibria. Section 4 contains our main convergence results. Sec-
tion 5 contains the asymptotic optimality results. Section 6 contains the k-double auction
counterexamples. Section 7 concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The agents are potential buyers and sellers of a homogeneous, indivisible good. Each buyer
has a unit demand, while each seller has a unit supply. All traders are risk neutral. Potential
buyers are heterogeneous in their valuations (or types) v of the good. Potential sellers are
also heterogeneous in their costs (or types) c of providing the good. The buyers draw their
types i.i.d. from some strictly increasing c.d.f. F and the sellers draw their types i.i.d.
from some strictly increasing c.d.f. G. For simplicity, we assume that the supports of these
distributions are [0; 1]. Each trader's type remains the same over time. We index time
periods by t =    ; 1; 0; 1;    ; each time period has length  > 0. The instantaneous
discount rate is r  0, and the corresponding discount factor is R = e r . Each period
consists of the following stages.
 The mass b of potential buyers and the mass s of potential sellers are born. The
new-born buyers draw their types i.i.d. from the distribution F and the new-born
sellers draw their types i.i.d. from the distribution G.
 Entry (or participation, or being active): The new-born potential buyers and sellers
decide whether to enter the market. Those who enter together with the current pools
of traders in the market compose the set of active traders. Those who do not enter
leave the market immediately, and get zero payo.
 The active buyers and sellers incur participation costs B and S respectively.
 The active buyers and sellers are randomly matched in pairs. The mass of the matches
is given by a matching function M(B;S), where B and S are the masses of active
buyers and active sellers currently in the market. The probability `B that a buyer is
matched is equal to M (B;S) =B, and he is equally likely to meet any active seller.
Symmetrically, the seller's matching probability is `S =M (B;S) =S and she is equally
likely to meet any active buyer.11 The matching is anonymous.
10As Shneyerov and Wong (forthcoming) have recently emphasized, dynamic matching and bargaining
games with costly search as here have very dierent properties from the games with costless search.
11We conjecture that such a matching process can arise in the limit of nite economies. Let GnB ;nSL be
the set of all bilateral matching graphs with nB buyer nodes, nS seller nodes and L edges. All the edges are
assumed to be nonadjacent. Let PnB ;nSL be the probability measure on G
nB ;nS
L that assigns equal probability
to each graph in GnB ;nSL . In this stochastic matching model, (i) the probability of matching is L=nB for the
buyers and L=nS for the seller, and (ii) conditional on matching, each buyer is equally likely to be matched
with any seller. Our matching technology can be understood in this framework, as arising in the limit as
n ! 1 of the measures PnB ;nSM(nB ;nS) with nB approximately equal to n  B and nS approximately equal to
n  S. If the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale, it is easy to see that a buyer's probability
of matching `B = M (nB ; nS) =nB  M (B;S) =B, and similarly `S  M (B;S) =B. Moreover, each buyer
continues to be equally likely matched with any seller.
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 The bargaining outcome of the match between type v buyer and type c seller is
determined by an incentive compatible (IC) and ex post individually rational (IR)
direct bargaining mechanism (DBM). If the buyer and seller trade, they leave the
market. If the bargaining breaks down, both traders remain in the market.
Assumption 1 (matching function) The matching function M is continuous on R2+,
nondecreasing in each argument, exhibits constant returns to scale (i.e. is homogeneous of
degree one), and satises M (0; S) =M (B; 0) = 0 and M (B;S)  min fB;Sg.
Let   B=S be the ratio of the mass of buyers to the mass of sellers currently active
in the market (or market tightness), and dene m()  M(; 1). Since the matching
technology exhibits constant returns to scale, the matching probabilities for buyers and
sellers are
`B ()  m ()

; `S ()  m () :
Note that `B and `S are continuous on R++, and respectively nonincreasing and nonde-
creasing functions of . Dene
K ()  B
`B ()
+
S
`S ()
:
The functionK () can be interpreted as the participation costs incurred by a pair of traders
over the time period of length  = 1, inated by their probabilities of matching `B () and
`S ().
Our equilibrium notion parallels that of Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007), so we
skip many details elucidated there and focus on the dierences due to the fact that we
are considering DBMs. We assume that the market is in a steady state and denote the
market distributions of active buyer and seller types as  and  . We denote the supports
of these distributions as AB and AS . Denote as WB (v) and WS (c) the beginning-of-
period market utilities of type v buyers and type c sellers, contingent on entry. Only the
buyers with WB (v)  0 and sellers with WS (c)  0 are active, so AB and AS are the
sets fv 2 [0; 1] :WB (v)  0g and fc 2 [0; 1] :WS (c)  0g. Let v = inf AB be the lower
boundary of AB and c = supAS be the upper boundary of AS . We only consider equilibria
with entry, i.e. those in which v < 1 and c > 0, so that the steady-state masses B and S of
active buyers and sellers are positive.
As in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007), the market utilities are taken as exogenous
to the DBM, because they simply reect the values of outside options. If we normalize
the no trade outcome as yielding 0 utilities to the traders, the relevant reservation values
become
~v (v) = v  RWB (v) ; ~c (c) = c+RWS (c) : (1)
Following Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007), we will call these the dynamic types of
buyers and sellers. The market distributions of ~v (v) and ~c (c) are denoted as ~ and ~ .
In each meeting, for given types v; c 2 [0; 1], the ex post budget balanced DBM induces
the trading probability q (v; c) and the expected payment t (v; c) made by the buyer to the
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seller. Given that the partner types are drawn from the market distributions  and  , the
associated interim probabilities and payments are
qB (v) =
Z
q (v; c) d  (c) ; tB (v) =
Z
t (v; c) d  (c)
for buyers, and
qS (c) =
Z
q (v; c) d (v) ; tS (c) =
Z
t (v; c) d (v)
for sellers. We invoke the revelation principle and assume that the DBM satises IC and
IR. Let
uB
 
v; v0

= ~v (v) qB
 
v0
  tB  v0 ;
uS
 
c; c0

= tS
 
c0
  ~c (c) qS  c0
be the interim DBM utilities for v type buyers and c type sellers, over and above their
market search values, if they report v0 and c0. The IC conditions here mean that these
utilities are maximal under truthful reporting:
UB (v)  uB (v; v) = max
v02[0;1]
uB
 
v; v0

; (2)
US (c)  uS (c; c) = max
c02[0;1]
uS
 
c; c0

: (3)
The IR condition means that UB (v)  0 and US (c)  0; however, we restrict attention to
ex post IR mechanisms, i.e. for any (v; c),
~c (c) q (v; c)  t (v; c)  ~v (v) q (v; c) : (4)
The market utilities WB (v) and WS (c) must satisfy the recursive equations
WB (v) = `BUB (v) +RWB (v)  B; (5)
WS (c) = `SUS (c) +RWS (c)  S : (6)
Note that WB (v) and WS (c) are dened for all types v; c 2 [0; 1], not only those that are
active.
The steady-state assumption implies the following mass balance conditions for v 2 AB,
c 2 AS :
b  dF (v) = B`B()qB(v)  d(v); s  dG (c) = S`S () qS (c)  d  (c) : (7)
These equations complete the description of the market equilibrium E = (qB; qS ; tB; tS ;WB,
WS ; B; S;; ).
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3 Basic Properties of Equilibria
Our rst result gives basic equilibrium properties for any IC and IR DBM.
Lemma 1 The sets of active trader types are intervals: AB = [v; 1] and AS = [0; c]. The
trading probability qB(v) is strictly positive and nondecreasing in v on AB, while qS(c) is
strictly positive and nonincreasing in c on AS. Moreover,
WB(v) =
Z v
v
`BqB (x)
1 R +R `BqB (x)dx for all v 2 [v; 1] ; (8)
WS(c) =
Z c
c
`SqS (x)
1 R +R `SqS (x)dx for all c 2 [0; c] : (9)
The functions ~v and ~c are absolutely continuous and nondecreasing. Their slopes are
~v0(v) =
1 R
1 R +R `BqB (v) (a.e. v 2 AB) ; (10)
~c0(c) =
1 R
1 R +R `SqS (c) (a.e. c 2 AS) : (11)
This lemma is proved in the Appendix. To gain the intuition for e.g. (8), assume that
WB is dierentiable on AB. Then the Envelope Theorem applied to the IC condition (2)
yields for any v 2 AB,
U 0B (v) = ~v
0 (v) qB (v)
=
 
1 RW 0B (v)

qB (v) : (12)
Dierentiating the recursive equation (5) and substituting the slope U 0B (v) from (12), we
have
W 0B (v) = `BU
0
B (v) +RW
0
B (v)
= `B
 
1 RW 0B (v)

qB (v) +RW
0
B (v)
for v 2 AB. Solving the above equation for W 0B (v) yields the integrand that appears in (8).
Since the sets of active trader types are intervals, we call v and c the marginal partic-
ipating types, or marginal entrants. Since WB(v) = WS(c) = 0, the marginal participating
types are equal to the corresponding dynamic types: c = ~c (c), v = ~v (v).
Evaluating (5) and (6) at v = v and c = c, we obtain
UB (v) =
B
`B ()
; (13)
US (c) =
S
`S ()
: (14)
In other words, the expected mechanism payos for the marginal buyers and sellers are just
sucient to cover their expected search costs until the next meeting.
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Dene
c  ~c (0) ; v  ~v (1) :
If the DBM is ex post IR, then necessarily
c < v; c < v: (15)
Otherwise say the marginal buyers would not be able to trade protably with even the
lowest cost sellers, because the latter would prefer to search for a better match in the
market.12
We dene the competitive, or Walrasian, price p as the price that clears the ows of
the arriving cohorts:
b[1  F (p)] = sG (p) :
From the steady-state mass balance condition b [1  F (v)] = sG (c), the marginal par-
ticipating types v and c must be on dierent sides of the Walrasian price p, i.e. either
c  p  v or v  p  c. Therefore (15) implies that p must always fall within the
acceptance interval, i.e. p 2 [c; v].
4 NBP Mechanisms and their Rate of Convergence
We now introduce our nonvanishing bargaining power (NBP) conditions that will imply
convergence to perfect competition. Let
U (v; c) = v   c R (WB (v) +WS (c))
be the bargaining surplus available to share in a given meeting of a v-type buyer and c-
type seller. Our conditions generalize the essential property of the random proposer take
it or leave it games, namely that each trader has some bargaining power, in the sense that
he or she can guarantee some fraction of the bargaining surplus. From now on, we will
often use the notation U , UB , US , etc. to emphasize the dependence of equilibrium
objects on  . Our NBP conditions require that, for any active buyer of type v, his DBM
utility UB (v) is at least some xed, independent of  , fraction of the minimal bargaining
surplus minc2AS U (v; c) in his meetings in the market, if there is any. Similarly, any
active seller of type c can guarantee a certain fraction of the minimal bargaining surplus
minv2AB U (v; c).
Assumption 2 (Buyer NBP condition) There exists B > 0 such that 8v 2 AB and
8 > 0 suciently small,
UB (v)  B min
c2AS
U (v; c) : (16)
12For example, to prove c < v, suppose v  c. Then for any c 2 AS , the ex post IR property (4) implies
vq (v; c)  t (v; c)  [v   ~c (c)] q (v; c)  (v   c) q (v; c)  0:
But it implies UB (v) = 0, contradicting (13).
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Assumption 3 (Seller NBP condition) There exists S > 0 such that 8c 2 AS and
8 > 0 suciently small,
US (c)  S min
v2AB
U (v; c) : (17)
Denition 1 A DBM that satises IC, ex post IR, and the two NBP conditions above is
called an NBP bargaining mechanism.
Remark 1 Since the dynamic type functions ~v ; ~c are nondecreasing, ~v (v)  v and
~c (c)  c . Moreover,
U (v; c) = ~v (v)  ~c (c) :
It follows that the NBP conditions can be equivalently stated as
UB (v)  B (~v (v)  c ) ; US (c)  S (v   ~c (c)) : (18)
The maximum DBM surplus ever available for buyers and sellers in the market equilib-
rium is
max
v2AB ;c2AS
U (v; c) = v   c :
Our main result in this section is the following theorem and its corollary. The theorem
provides a lower and upper bounds on v   c , and the corollary provides an upper bound
on the deviations of the equilibrium utilities WB (v) and WS (c) from the Walrasian
utilities. Before stating the theorem, we dene what it means for a sequence to converge
at a linear rate.
Denition 2 For any real sequence fxg indexed by  > 0 with  ! 0, we say that x ! 0
as  ! 0 at a linear rate if and only if 9x; x 2 R++ such that for all suciently small
 > 0,   x  jx j    x.13
Theorem 1 For any sequence of market equilibria E with  ! 0,
max
v2AB ;c2AS
U (v; c)! 0
as  ! 0 at a linear rate if and only if the NBP conditions (16) and (17) hold. Moreover,
under these conditions,
    v   c   
K (0)
B + S

1 +
2r

3
: (19)
where   minfB; Sg and
0  B
S
S
B
:
Note that the bounds in Theorem 1 do not depend on the distributions F and G.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the following lemma showing that (16) and (17) imply
that the entry gap v   c , if any, is bounded by K (0) =(B + S).
13Equivalently, lim!0 sup jx j= <1 and lim!0 inf jx j= > 0.
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Lemma 2 (Bound for entry gap) For any NBP bargaining mechanism, we have
max fv   c ; 0g   min

B
B`B ()
;
S
S`S ()

   K (0)
B + S
: (20)
Lemma 2 implies that, if there is a positive entry gap v   c , it is O (). For the length
of the acceptance interval [c ; v ] we can write:
v   c  (c   c ) + (v   c ) + (v   v )
=
Z c
0
~c0 (c)dc+ (v   c ) +
Z 1
v
~v0 (v)dv:
The idea of the proof of the suciency result in Theorem 1 is to bound the slopes of dynamic
types ~v0 (v) and ~c0 (c). Recall Lemma 1; it implies for a.e. active buyers and sellers
~v0 (v) =
r
`B ( ) qB (v)
+ o () ; ~c0 (c) =
r
`S ( ) qS (c)
+ o () :
In the proof, we show that (a)  is uniformly bounded from above and below, so that
both `B ( ) and `S ( ) are bounded from below for small  > 0, and (b) the probabilities
of trading qB (v) and qS (c) are also bounded from below uniformly for all active types.
Then it is clear that the slopes ~v0 (v) and ~c0 (c) will converge to 0 at a linear rate. The
intuition for the lower bound in (19) is that, for a given , ex post IR implies that the
expected prot of type v buyer in a given meeting is no more than `B (0) (v   c ) and
therefore v   c  B=`B ( )  B. Similarly, v   c  S .
Dene traders' Walrasian utilities in the usual manner, as
W B (v) = maxfv   p; 0g; W S (c) = maxfp   c; 0g:
Let
W+B (v) = max fWB (v) ; 0g ; W+S (c) = max fWS (c) ; 0g
be the traders' equilibrium market utilities.
Corollary 1 For any sequence of market equilibria E with  ! 0, if the NBP conditions
(16) and (17) hold, then 8v; c 2 [0; 1],
max
jW B (v) W+B (v) j; jW S (c) W+S (c) j	   
"
r +
K (0)
B + S

1 +
2r

3#
: (21)
In particular, as  ! 0, the rate of convergence of equilibrium utilities W+B (v) and W+S (c)
is O ().
Remark 2 Since W B(v) W+B (v) and W S(c) W+S (c) are not guaranteed to be positive,
the absolute values are needed. Indeed, if v < p
, then buyers with type v 2 (v ; p] would
have strictly positive utilities in equilibrium but have 0 Walrasian utilities. We also do not
have a positive lower bound in Corollary 1. Indeed, for some types v, c 2 [0; 1] we could
have W B(v) =W
+
B (v) = 0 and/or W

S(c) =W
+
S (c) = 0.
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Remark 3 Our explicit bound (21) in Corollary 1 can be tight when frictions are small,
even when  does not go to 0. For example, suppose that  = 1 and consider the case of
small frictions B, S and r. For simplicity, suppose that frictions are proportionally small
in the following sense: (B; S ; r) =  (1; 1; r0), where  > 0 is small. Then r= = r0 and
K (0) =  

1
`B (0)
+
1
`S (0)

;
where 0 = B=S. Clearly, the r.h.s. of (21) becomes small with .
We now turn to some concrete examples of bargaining protocols whose associated DBMs
satisfy Assumptions 2 and 3 in Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.14. We assume that bargaining
is instantaneous and the protocol does not change with  .15 For each bargaining protocol,
we verify the NBP conditions by proposing a feasible strategy that guarantees the buyer
and seller the payo bounds in (18).
Example 1 Random-proposer take it or leave it oer games where either a buyer or a
seller is chosen to be a proposer with positive probabilities, B 2 (0; 1) for buyers and
S = 1  B for sellers. When chosen as the proposer, a buyer has the option to propose
c, and a seller has the option to propose v. These oers would be accepted in a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium by sellers with c < c and buyers with v > v respectively. We therefore
have the NBP conditions (18).
Example 2 Repeated take it or leave it oer games in which the seller is chosen as a
proposer with probability  2 (0; 1), and the buyer is chosen with the complementary prob-
ability 1   . The proposer then makes N sequential oers to the responder. After each
rejected oer, the game is exogenously terminated with probability  2 (0; 1). In any Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, every trader has a deviation strategy in which he or she would make
unacceptable oers until the nal round. In the nal round, he or she would make an oer
that would be surely accepted. For example, a buyer can follow this strategy and guarantee
that, ex ante, he is a take it or leave it proposer with probability B = (1  ) (1  )N 1.
When he is a take it or leave it proposer, he can deviate and oer the price p = c: In a
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, this oer would be accepted by any seller having c < c. A
parallel construction for the seller leads to the NBP conditions (18).
Example 3 Alternate take it or leave it oer games in which the rst proposer is chosen
to be the seller with probability  2 (0; 1) and the buyer with probability 1  . The traders
alternate making proposals for N rounds. Once again, the game may be terminated with
probability  2 (0; 1) after each rejected oer. Here, in any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
every trader has a deviation strategy in which he or she would make unacceptable oers
and reject all oers until the nal round. If he or she is a take it or leave it proposer in the
nal round, he or she would make an oer that would be surely accepted. For example,
14These examples are discussed in e.g. Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002).
15Our assumption of instantaneous bargaining is natural because we focus on the frictions of costly, time
consuming search.
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a buyer can follow this strategy and guarantee that, ex ante, he is a take it or leave it
proposer with probability B = (1  ) (1  )N 1 when N is odd and B =  (1  )N 1
when N is even. When he is a take it or leave it proposer, he can deviate and oer the price
p = c. In a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, this oer would be accepted by any seller having
c < c. Once again, repeating the logic of Example 1, we can verify the NBP conditions
(18).
One can extend the logic of the above examples to show that Assumptions 2 and 3 are
satised by any instantaneous protocol such that (i) the buyer has a strategy such that the
play of the bargaining game passes through a node where he is a take it or leave it proposer
with probability at least B > 0, and (ii) the seller has a strategy such that the play passes
through a node where she is a take it or leave it proposer with probability at least S > 0.
16
5 Asymptotic Optimality of NBP Mechanisms
Let
W 0 = b
Z 1
p
(v   p) dF (v) + s
Z p
0
(p   c) dG (c) :
be the Walrasian welfare of a cohort, and let
W 0 = b
Z
W+B (v) dF (v) + s
Z
W+SdG (c) :
be its market welfare. Our main result in this section is that no bargaining mechanism can
attain a faster than linear rate of convergence.
Theorem 2 For any sequence of market equilibria E ,
W 0  W 0    b [1  F (v )]min
>0
K () : (22)
As  ! 0, the rate of convergence of W 0  W 0 to 0 cannot be faster than linear.
Corollary 2 Any random-proposer take it leave it oer protocol is asymptotically optimal,
in the sense that W 0 !W 0 at a linear rate.
Remark 4 The proof of Theorem 2 only requires the individual rationality of the bargaining
mechanism and therefore also applies to the full information setting as in e.g. Mortensen
and Wright (2002).
The intuition for Theorem 2 is that with matching frictions, the loss of welfare due to
costly delay is unavoidable regardless of the bargaining protocol. An interesting further
question is how to isolate the welfare loss due to strategic behavior. One way of doing so
is to compensate the traders for the costs of participation and time discounting that they
16The previous version of this paper, available at http://artyom239.googlepages.com/DMBG_rate_of_
convergence_discrete_Ju.pdf, called these protocols generalized random proposer TIOLI, (GRP TIOLI).
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incur in equilibrium. To formalize the idea, one can eliminate WB (v) for v 2 AB and
WS (c) for c 2 AS from the recursive equations (5) and (6):
WB (v) =
`B [qB (v) v   tB (v)]  B
1 R +R `BqB (v) ; WS (c) =
`S [tS (c)  qS (c) c]  S
1 R +R `SqS (c) : (23)
Eliminating the time discounting and participation costs from the value functions in (23),
we can dene the welfare loss due to strategic eects as
w =W
0   b
Z
AB

v   tB (v)
qB (v)

dF (v)  s
Z
AS

tS (c)
qS (c)
  c

dG (c) :
Since bdF (v) =qB (v) = B `Bd (v), sdG (c) =qS (c) = S `Sd  (c), and the transfers
are balanced,
B `B
Z
v2AB
tB (v) d (v) = S `S
Z
c2AS
tS (c) d  (c) ;
we have
w =W
0   b
Z
AB
vdF (v) + s
Z
AS
cdG (c) :
By Lemma 1, the sets of participating types AB and AS are intervals, i.e. AB = [v ; 1]
and AS = [0; c ]. The welfare loss w is then equal to the area of the familiar "deadweight
loss" triangle,
w = b
Z v
p
(v   p) dF (v) + s
Z p
c
(p   c) dG (c) :
The ineciency loss w is due only to inecient entry, because the marginal participating
types v , c may be dierent from p
. As is well known, the area of the "deadweight loss"
triangle is asymptotically proportional to jv   c j2, and therefore w = O

jv   c j2

.
Theorem 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 3 For any sequence of market equilibria E satisfying the NBP conditions, the
welfare loss due to strategic behavior w = O
 
2

converges to 0 at a no slower than
quadratic rate.
6 Nonconvergent and Slow Convergent Equilibria of the k-
Double Auction
Recall the rules of the bilateral k-double auction: the buyer and the seller simultaneously
and independently submit a bid price pB and an ask price pS respectively, and then trade
occurs if and only if the buyer's bid is at least as high as the seller's ask, at the weighted
average price (1  k)pS + kpB, where k 2 (0; 1). In this section we show that the dynamic
matching market with the bilateral k-double auction has sequences of equilibria that do not
converge to perfect competition at a linear rate. Moreover, we show that some sequences
of equilibria do not converge at all.
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We distinguish two classes of double-auction equilibria: full trade and nonfull trade. A
full trade equilibrium is characterized by the property that every meeting results in trade.
We claim that the class of full trade equilibria includes equilibria that are very inecient,
even with arbitrarily small frictions. (But it also includes equilibria that converge to perfect
competition.)
From Lemma 1, the sets AB, AS of active types are still intervals [v; 1] and [0; c] for
some marginal types v and c; and we also have ~v(v) < v and ~c(c) > c for all v > v and
all c < c. Since all active traders' trading probabilities are strictly positive, they must in
equilibrium submit serious bids/asks, and therefore, we must have pB(v)  ~v(v) < v and
pS(c)  ~c(c) > c for all v > v and all c < c. Now it is clear that for an equilibrium to be full
trade, we must have c  v, and all traders must submit a common bid/ask p. Hence every
matched pair trades at the price p. Furthermore, v-buyers and c-sellers have to recover
their participation costs, thus in any full trade equilibrium we have c < p < v for some
p 2 (0; 1).17
Any full trade equilibrium must satisfy indierence equations for the marginal types, as
well as the mass balance equation:
`B () (v   p) = B; (24)
`S () (p  c) = S ; (25)
b[1  F (v)] = sG (c) : (26)
The converse is also true, i.e. any quadruple fp; ; v; cg satisfying (24), (25), (26) and
  K () < 1 must characterize a full trade equilibrium. In particular, any trader's best-
response bid/ask strategy is p, given that all other active traders use this strategy.
From equations (24) and (25), it follows that the entry gap is
v   c = K () : (27)
The next proposition shows that v   c can be arbitrarily close to 1 for all  small enough
so that a non-trivial equilibrium exists. Therefore equilibrium outcomes can be arbitrarily
far from eciency even with small frictions. The set of equilibrium entry gaps converges
to (0; 1) as frictions disappear, so the set of full trade equilibria ranges from perfectly
competitive to almost perfectly inecient. Moreover, the set of equilibrium prices also
converges to (0; 1). Thus indeterminacy grows rather than vanishes with competition,
contrary to the results in the static double auction literature.
Proposition 1 Under bilateral k-double auction, a full trade equilibrium exists if and only
if
 min
>0
K () < 1: (28)
The set of equilibrium values of v   c is an interval [  min>0K () ; 1). As  ! 0, this
set and the set of equilibrium prices converge to (0; 1) In particular, there exists a sequence
of full trade equilibria that converges to perfect competition, but also sequences that do not
converge.
17It has been known at least since Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and Leininger, Linhart, and Radner
(1989) that k-DAs have multiple equilibria. The latter paper in fact looks at equilibria where buyers and
sellers can trade only at price p, and shows that such equilibria exist for any price p 2 (0; 1).
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Figure 1: A two-step equilibrium of the k-double auction
By looking at the equilibria with the smallest entry gap, v   c =  min>0K (), we
can see that the following corollary is true.
Corollary 4 There are full trade equilibria that converge, in terms of the ex ante utilities,
at a linear rate.
It is not hard to see that the condition   min>0K () < 1 is also necessary for any
nontrivial steady-state equilibrium to exist. We thus have the following corollary.
Corollary 5 There exists a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium (either full trade or nonfull
trade) if and only if  min>0K () < 1.
Remark 5 This necessary and sucient condition is weaker than the one for the random-
proposer take it or leave it oer bargaining, as shown in Shneyerov and Wong (forthcoming).
Note that the sequences of k-DA equilibria in Proposition 1 have the property that
market becomes extremely unbalanced as  ! 0: the buyer to seller ratio  either tends
to 0 (if p > p) of to 1 (if p < p). We now proceed to show that there also exist
nonfull trade k-DA equilibria that do not converge to perfect competition, even though
 remains bounded from above and below along the sequence. In the theorem below, we
show existence of equilibria with two steps (see Figure 1). There are two seller cuto types
c^ 2 (0; 1) and c 2 (0; 1) with c^ < c, and two buyer cuto types v^ 2 (0; 1) and v 2 (0; 1)
with v^ > v. The sellers with c 2 [0; c^) enter and bid pS(c) = p, where p is some constant
strictly below p. The sellers with c 2 [c^; c] enter and bid pS(c) = p, where p > p. The
sellers with c 2 (c; 1] do not enter. Similarly, the buyers with v 2 (v^; 1] enter and bid p, the
buyers with v 2 [v; v^] enter and submit p, and the buyers with v 2 [0; v) do not enter.
The following theorem contains our non-convergence result for the two-step class of
equilibria.
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Theorem 3 For any a 2 (0; 1), there exist r0 > 0, 0 > 0 and W < W 0 such that for all
r 2 [0; r0) and  2 (0; 0), there exists a two-step equilibrium in which the price spread is
larger than a, i.e. p p > a, and the total ex ante surplus is smaller than W , i.e. W 0 < W .
In both examples (full and nonfull trade), the existence of slow (or non) convergent
sequences of equilibria can be traced to the violation of the NBP conditions (16) and (17).
The marginal types v = v and c = c have interim utilities UB (v ) and US (c ) just
sucient to cover their expected search costs until the next meeting (see (13) and (14)):
UB (v ) =
B
`B ( )
; US (c ) =
S
`S ( )
:
For the marginal types, the NBP conditions (see Remark 1) require existence of B > 0
and S > 0 such that 8 > 0 suciently small,
B
`B ( )
 B v   c

; (29)
S
`S ( )
 S v   c

: (30)
Consider full trade equilibria that are slowly (or non) convergent: let (v   c ) = !1.
Obviously `B ( ) and `S ( ) cannot be both convergent to 0. If `B ( ) is not convergent
to 0, then (29) is violated, while if `S ( ) is not convergent to 0, then (30) is violated.
Unlike in Proposition 1, the construction in the proof of Theorem 3 treats buyers and
sellers symmetrically. In particular,  could be xed at any value, say  = 0. Now
consider nonfull trade equilibria that are slow (or non) convergent and have  = 0 for all
suciently small  > 0. In these equilibria, both (29) and (30) are necessarily violated as
 ! 0.
The rules of the double auction do not guarantee that each trader has at least some
bargaining power. On the other hand, in the NBP mechanisms, both parties have some
bargaining power. This creates strong incentive to enter for both buyers and sellers and
drives the marginal participating types close to each other and at the same time close to
the Walrasian price.
7 Concluding Remarks
In a framework of dynamic matching and bargaining, we have provided a complete charac-
terization of bilateral trade mechanism sequences that converge to perfect competition at
a linear rate, which is shown to be the fastest possible. The conditions are easy to check
for a number of interesting bargaining protocols. Any random-proposer take it or leave it
oer mechanism satises these conditions, while k-double auctions violate them and have
equilibria that converge to perfect competition slowly, or not at all.
We believe that the mechanism design approach to bilateral search that we have devel-
oped in this paper would be useful for showing convergence to perfect competition (with
rate) in other settings such as multilateral bargaining in a market with many-to-many
matches as e.g. in Dagan, Serrano, and Volij (2000), or on networks as in Abreu and
Manea (2008). We are currently pursuing these extensions.
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A dierent issue is that our non-convergent examples for the k-double auction require a
great deal of coordination among the traders. Additional assumptions, e.g. the continuity
of strategies, could be imposed to restrict the set of equilibria with the purpose of proving
their convergence at a linear rate. In addition, allowing a multilateral matching technology
might also restore convergence of all equilibria of the k-double auction mechanism. These
extensions are left for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the results for buyers only; the argument for the sellers is parallel. We begin
by noting that the IC condition (2) and the recursive equation (5) together imply that
8v; v0 2 [0; 1],
1 R +R `BqB
 
v0

WB (v)  `B

vqB
 
v0
  tB  v0  B; (31)
and the inequality becomes equality if v0 = v. For v 2 AB, the l.h.s. is non-negative, so
it follows that vqB (v) > tB (v). Then IR condition implies v > 0 and qB (v) > 0 for any
v 2 AB.
Condition (31) implies
WB (v) = max
v02[0;1]
`B [vqB (v
0)  tB (v0)]  B
1 R +R `BqB (v0) :
As the maximum of a set of nondecreasing and ane functions,WB is absolutely continuous
and convex, and therefore dierentiable almost everywhere on [0; 1]. The Envelope Theorem
(Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002)) then implies
W 0B (v) =
`BqB (v)
1 R +R `BqB (v) a.e. on [0; 1] ,
and (10) must also hold. From the continuity of WB, we have WB (v) = 0 and hence (8)
follows. Since qB (v) > 0 for v 2 AB, WB is increasing on AB, and therefore AB must be
an interval [v; 1]. The convexity of WB implies that qB is nondecreasing. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
By the buyer NBP condition, UB (v )  B (v   c ). The equilibrium condition (13) then
implies B  B`B () (v   c ). Similarly, we can show that S  S`S () (v   c ),
and therefore
v   c   min

B
B`B ()
;
S
S`S ()

:
Now since `B is nonincreasing and `S is nondecreasing, the above minimum is maximized
at  = 0 because
B
B`B (0)
=
S
S`S (0)
;
and the resulting value of the maximum is K (0) =(B + S). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1
Suciency proof:
Step 1 : We claim that
(a):
v   c
v   c
 B
r + B
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(b):
v   c
v   c
 S
r + S
:
We provide the proof for part (a) only. The proof for part (b) is the ip of that for part
(a). First note that the ex post IR condition (4) implies tB (v )  cqB (v ). Otherwise
there is some c 2 AS such that t (v ; c) < cq (v ; c)  ~c (c) q (v ; c), contradicting (4).
Since qB is nondecreasing, (13) then implies that for any v 2 [v ; 1],
`BqB (v)(v   c )  `BqB (v )(v   c )  `B [qB (v )v   tB (v )] = B;
and therefore
`BqB (v)  B
v   c
: (32)
Then for almost all v 2 [v ; 1],
~v0 (v) =
1 R
1 R +R `BqB (v) 
r
`BqB (v)
 r
B=(v   c )
;
where the second last inequality follows by the concavity of the function 1  e x. Hence
v   v =
Z 1
v
~v0 (v)dv 
r
B=(v   c )
;
v   v
v   c
 r
B
;
v   c
v   c
=
1
1 + (v   v )=(v   c )
 1
1 + rB
=
B
r + B
:
Step 2 : We claim that
(a): minfv ; cg   c 
4r (r + B)
`SSB
(b): v  maxfv ; cg 
4r(r + S)
`BBS
:
Again by symmetry, we only provide a proof for (a). Let y  minfv ; cg c . Consider
a type c seller with ~c (c)  c + y=2. By the seller NBP condition,
US (c)  S [v   ~c (c)] :
Since v ~c (c)  v (c + y=2), and our denition of y implies that y  v c , it follows
that v   ~c (c)  (v   c ) =2 and therefore
tS (c)  ~c (c)qS (c) = US (c)  S v   c
2
:
Moreover, the ex post IR condition (4) implies tS (c)  vqS (c). Otherwise there is
some v 2 AB such that t (v; c) > vq (v; c)  ~v (v) q (v; c), contradicting (4).
Combining these with the monotonicity of ~c (c), we obtain
(v   c ) qS (c)  [v   ~c (c)] qS (c)  tS (c)  ~c (c)qS (c)  S
v   c
2
;
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and therefore
qS (c)  S
2
v   c
v   c
 SB
2 (r + B)
;
where the last inequality follows from applying the bound from step 1(a).
Then from (11) in Lemma 1,
~c0 (c) =
1 R
1 R +R `SqS (c) 
r
`SqS (c)
 r
`SSB=2 (r + B)
=
2r (r + B)
`SSB
:
Now we can see that
y
2
=
Z
~c (c)2[c ;c+ y2 ]
~c0 (c) dc 
2r (r + B)
`SSB
;
which is the same as (a).
Step 3 : Let  = minfB; Sg. We claim that
v   c   min

B
B`B
;
S
S`S



1 +
2r

3
:
To prove it, rst notice that from step 2(a) and (20), we have
v   c = minfv ; cg   c +max fv   c ; 0g 
4r (r + B)
`SSB
+
S
`SS
:
Then from step 1(a),
v   c 
r + B
B
(v   c )  
r + B
`SSB

4r(r + B)
B
+ S

= 
S
`SS

1 +
r
B

1 +
4r
S

1 +
r
B

  S
`SS

1 +
r


1 +
4r


1 +
r


= 
S
`SS

1 +
r


1 +
2r

2
  S
S`S

1 +
2r

3
:
Similarly, from step 2(b) and step 1(b),
v   c  
B
`BB

1 +
2r

3
:
Step 4 : Notice that S= (`S ()S) is nonincreasing and B= (`B ()B) is nondecreas-
ing in , and that they are equal if and only if  = 0. If  = 0, both of them are equal to
K (0) = (B + S). Thus step 3 implies the upper bound in the Theorem.
Step 5 : Finally, we show that v   c  . Consider once again (13) and (14).
Since `BqB and `SqS are at most 1, and the ex post IR condition (4) implies tB (v ) 
cqB (v ) and tS (c )  vqS (c ), we have
v   c  v   c  B and v   c  v   c  S :
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Consequently,
v   c   max fB; Sg  :
Necessity proof:
Take any sequence of ex post IR and IC DBM market equilibria, with v   c ! 0 at a
linear rate. Then (see footnote 13)
lim
!0
sup
v   c

<1: (33)
Step 1 : There exist B; S ;  > 0 such that for any  2 (0; ),
qB (v )  B and qS (c )  S :
To prove that, rst recall (32) in the Suciency proof step 1 (which only requires IC
and ex post IR conditions). We have, for any  > 0,
qB (v )  `B ( ) qB (v )  B 

v   c
:
Now notice that (33) implies
lim
!0
sup
v   c

 lim
!0
sup
v   c

<1
so that
lim
!0
inf qB (v )  B  lim
!0
inf

v   c
> 0:
Therefore, there exist B > 0 and  > 0 such that  2 (0; ) implies qB (v )  B.
Similarly one can prove the claim for qS (c ).
Step 2 : There exist B; S ;  > 0 such that for any  2 (0; ),
UB (v )  B  (v   c ) and US (c )  S  (v   c ) :
To prove that, rst notice that (13) implies, for any  > 0,
UB (v )  `B ( )UB (v ) = B
so that
max fv   c ; 0g
UB (v )
 max fv   c ; 0g
B
 1
B
 v   c

:
Now (33) implies
lim
!0
sup
v   c
UB (v )
<1:
Therefore, there exist B > 0 and  > 0 such that  2 (0; ) implies UB (v )  B 
(v   c ). Similarly one can prove the claim for US (c ).
Step 3 : There exist B; S ;  > 0 such that for any  2 (0; ), any v 2 [v ; 1], and any
c 2 [0; c ],
UB (v)  B  (~v (v)  c ) and US (c)  S  (v   ~c (c)) :
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To prove that, we pick B; S ;  > 0 such that the claims in step 1 and step 2 hold.
By Lemma 1, the Envelope Theorem applies to the IC conditions (2). Thus, for all  2
(0; ) and almost all v 2 [v ; 1], we have U 0B (v) = ~v0 (v) qB (v). From the monotonicity
of qB and step 1,
U 0B (v)  ~v0 (v) qB (v )  B~v0 (v)
for almost all v 2 [v ; 1]. Together with step 2, this implies
UB (v) = UB (v ) +
Z v
v
U 0B (x) dx
 B (v   c ) + B
Z v
v
~v0 (x) dx
= B  (~v (v)  c ) :
Similarly one can prove the claim for US (c). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
We only prove the result for the buyers; the proof for the sellers is parallel. Observe that
RWB (v) = v   ~v (v). Consequently,
W B(v) RW+B (v) = maxfv   p; 0g  max fRWB (v); 0g
=
8>><>>:
~v (v)  p if v  v and v  p
~v (v)  v if v  v and v < p
v   p if v < v and v  p
0 if v < v and v < p

:
In any of the four cases, we must have
W B(v) RW+B (v)  v   c . It is obvious for
the fourth case. For the other three cases, recall that (i) p 2 [c ; v ], (ii) ~v (v) 2 [c ; v ]
under the conditions of the rst or second case, and (iii) v 2 [c ; v ] under the conditions
of the second or third case.
Moreover, W+B (v) RW+B (v) = (1 R )W+B (v)  r:
Therefore, W B(v) W+B (v)  v   c + r:
This corollary then follows from Theorem 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2
Recall (23). Since the traders in equilibrium enter voluntarily, the numerators in (23) are
non-negative for v 2 AB and c 2 AS . Consequently, for active types WB (v) and WS (c)
can be bounded from above as
WB (v)  `B [qB (v) v   tB (v)]  B
`BqB (v)
 v   tB (v)
qB (v)
  B
`B
;
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WS (c)  tS (c)
qS (c)
  c  S
`S
:
Now the total welfare of the entering cohort is bounded from above by
b
Z
AB
vdF (v)  s
Z
AS
cdG (c)
 

b
Z
AB
tB (v)
qB (v)
dF (v)  s
Z
AS
tS (c)
qS (c)
dG (c)

 

B
`B
+
S
`S

b
Z
AB
dF (v) :
Obviously, the rst term does not exceed the Walrasian welfare rateW 0 . The second term is
zero because in a steady state, bdF (v) =qB (v) = B`Bd (v), sdG (c) =qS (c) = S`Sd  (c) and
the transfers are balanced, B`B
R
v2AB tB (v) d (v) = S`S
R
c2AS tS (c) d  (c). Consequently,
W 0 W 0  

B
`B ()
+
S
`S ()

b
Z
AB
dF (v) :
The proof is completed by noting that B=`B () +S=`S ()   min>0K (). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows the graphical argument shown in Figure 2. Given  , the right panel
shows the marginal types v and c in a steady-state equilibrium. The left panel shows
the supportable values of the market tightness  and  that correspond to the given gap
v   c < 1. (In general, there can be one, two or more such values.)
Our assumptionM (0; S) =M (B; 0) = 0 implies `B (1) = `S (0) = 0. It in turn implies
lim
!0
K () = lim
!1
K () =1; (34)
as depicted in the left panel.
Given that (34) holds, a solution  to the equation K () = v   c exists if and only
if v   c 2 [ min>0K () ; 1). Since lim!0 K () = 0 for any  > 0, we also must have
  min>0K () ! 0 as  ! 0. It proves that the set of supportable entry gaps v   c
converges to the interval (0; 1).
Now x any  such that   min>0K () < 1. Consider the longest interval [0 ; 1 ]
such that K (0 ) = K (1 ) = 1 and K () < 1 for  2 (0; 1). For any  2 (0 ; 1 ), v
and c can be found uniquely from (27) and (26) (see Figure 2). Denote these mappings as
v () and c (). The equilibrium price p can also be found uniquely from equation (24)
or equation (25):
p ()  c () +   S
`S ()
(35)
( = v () 
  B
`B ()
): (36)
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Figure 2: Construction of a full-trade equilibrium of the k-double auction
This formally denes a continuous mapping p () of [0 ; 1 ] into R+. Consequently, its
image is a closed interval that contains the points p (0 ) and p (1 ); and the set of sup-
portable equilibrium prices contains this interval. The denitions of 0 and 1 imply
that 0 ! 0 and 1 ! 1 as  ! 0. Now c (1 ) = 0 for all  and `S (1 ) ! 1 as
 ! 0, therefore (35) implies that lim!0 p (1 ) = 0. Similarly, v (0 ) = 1 for all  and
`B (0 )!1 as  ! 0, so that (36) implies that lim!0 p (0 ) = 1. This proves that the
set of supportable equilibrium price converges to (0; 1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 5
Having Proposition 1, it is sucient to prove the necessity of the condition   B=`B() +
  S=`S() < 1. The fact that WB (v)  0 and WS (c)  0 for all active types implies that
8v 2 AB; c 2 AS ,
`B()
Z
[q(v; c)v   t(v; c)]d (c)    B; `S()
Z
[t(v; c)  q(v; c)c]d(v)    S
and hence
  B
`B()
+
  S
`S()

Z Z
(v   c)d(v)d (c) < 1:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3
We derive a system of equations characterizing the set of two-step equilibria. But before
doing so, it is convenient to introduce additional notation. In a two-price equilibrium, the
buyers with v > v^ who submit the high bid price p, trade with any seller they meet. Buyers
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with v 2 [v; v^], who submit the low bid price p, trade only with sellers having c < c^, who
submit p; their probability of trading is equal to  (c^). Similarly sellers with c < c^ trade
with any buyer they meet, and sellers with c 2 [c^; c] trade only with those buyers with
v > v^; their probability of trading is equal to 1  (v^).
In the equilibria to be constructed  (c^) and 1  (v^) will converge to 0 as  goes to 0,
so it is convenient to divide them by  :
B  1  (v^)

; S   (c^)

:
Since v-buyers and c-sellers are indierent between entering or not, we have
`BS(v   p) = B; (37)
`SB(p  c) = S : (38)
Since v^-buyers are indierent between biding p or p, and c^-sellers are indierent between
asking p or p, we have
S [~v(v^)  p] = S

~v(v^)  [(1  k)p+ kp]	+ (1  S) [~v(v^)  p]; (39)
B[p  ~c(c^)] = B

[(1  k)p+ kp]  ~c(c^)	+ (1  B) [p  ~c(c^)]: (40)
Since the utility equations (8), (9) still hold here, we have
W^B = (v^   v) m()S
 (1 R ) +Rm()S (41)
W^S = (c  c^) m()B
1 R +Rm()B : (42)
where we denoted W^B WB (v^) and W^S WS (c^).
To complete the description of a two-step equilibrium, the indierence conditions are
supplemented with steady-state mass balance conditions for each interval of types. Here, it
suces to require that the total inows into the intervals [v; 1] and [0; c] are balanced with
the outows,
b [1  F (v)] = Sm() [S + B (1  S)] ; (43)
sG(c) = Sm() [B + S(1  B)] ; (44)
and that the inows into the intervals v 2 [v^; 1] and [0; c^] are also balanced with the outows,
b[1  F (v^)] = Sm()B; (45)
sG(c^) = Sm()S : (46)
We also dene the price spread,
a0  p  p:
Then equations (37) through (46) form a 10-equation system with 12 endogenous vari-
ables fp; a0; ; v; c; v^; c^; B; S ; S; W^B; W^Sg. This system does characterize an equilibrium.
Indeed, one can easily see that the buyers with v 2 (v^; 1] strictly prefer to bid p, the buyers
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with v 2 (v; v^) strictly prefer to bid p, and the buyers with v 2 [0; v) strictly prefer not to
enter. Similar remark applies for sellers.
Since we have two degrees of freedom, we can x some  > 0 and a0 2 (a; 1) and then let
equations (37) - (46) determine fp; v; c; v^; c^; B; S ; S; W^B; W^Sg. We claim that a solution
exists for small enough  and r. To see this, one can check that when  = r = 0, we have a
(unique) solution with p implicitly determined by b[1   F (p + a0)] = sG(p), and all other
variables given by
c = p; v = p = p+ a0; B =
S
m()a0
; S =
B
m()a0
; S =
sG(p)a0
B + S
;
1  F (v^) = [1  F (p)]S
B + S
; G(c^) =
G(p)B
B + S
; W^B = v^   p; W^S = p  c^:
One can also check that the Jacobian evaluated at  = r = 0 is not zero.18 Therefore
the Implicit Function Theorem applies. Because p   p  a0 > a, there exists a two-step
equilibrium with p   p > a when  and r are small enough. Moreover, since v ! p and
c ! p as (; r) ! (0; 0), the spread v   c is also bounded below by a. It follows that
the associated total ex ante surplus W 0 is bounded away from the Walrasian total ex ante
surplus W 0. Q.E.D.
18The MathematicaR notebook that contains the evaluation of the Jacobian is available at
artyom239.googlepages.com.
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